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INTRODUCTION 
The object of urban planning is to improve the quality of life and the welfare of the 
community involved. However, planning policies and controls need to be embodied 
in legislation in order to make them applicable to the general public. Planning law 
has suffered from many shortcomings. It has reflected the racial bias of the past 
which has led to fragmented and unco-ordinated legislation. It reflects the previous 
Constitutional hierarchical allocation of powers which has resulted in centralised, "top 
down" planning with local authorities depending on Provincial government for 
delegated powers. It is control rather than development orientated. In order to 
provide a context for examining the effect of recent legislation on planning law, a brief 
summary of existing legislation will be set out. 
The Constitution No 108 of 1996, amendments to the Local Government Act No 209 
of 1993 and the Development Facilitation Act No 67 of 1995 have highlighted the 
inadequacies of planning law. This dissertation will examine how the Constitution 
has radically altered the structure of government and the impact this has on the 
autonomy of local government in respect of planning matters. This is important since 
local government is perceived as the ideal sphere to work in partnership with the 
community to deliver services where they are needed most and to take the initiative 
in development programmes. It also empowers local government to play a key role 
in reversing previous planning policies by creating integrated, densified cities. This 
dissertation will also examine the effect of the duty of local government to provide 
democratic and accountable government to local communities. It will examine the 
principles of responsive government namely participation by communities, 
accountability and openness of government. Their effect on planning law will be 
assessed. The allocation of powers between Metropolitan and Substructure levels 
of local government as set out in the Local Government Transition Act will be 
discussed. The concept of linking integrated development plans to financial budgets 
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and the impact this will have on planning law will be assessed. Finally, the 
Development Facilitation Act will be examined. This Act introduces innovative 
procedures to expedite land development. 
It has become clear that the existing legislation in the Western Cape is unable to 
accommodate these changes and a draft Planning and Development Bill has been 
published for comment. In order to assess its compliance with principles contained 
in recent legislation, criteria will be extracted from that legislation and used to analyse 
the draft Bill. 
, CHAPTER 1 
THE LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT OF PLANNING 
The purpose of urban planning is to: 
"improve the quality of life and the welfare of the community involved."1 
This is achieved through a series of guide plans, structure plans and zoning schemes 
which, in order to be binding on the general public and government bodies, are given 
statutory force. 
It is impossible to give a full exposition of what planning law consists of and that is not 
the purpose of this dissertation. There are however four crucial points which must 
be made. 
First, planning law straddles both private and public law2• It interfaces with property 
law, administrative law, environmental law, nuisance law and criminal law3• On the 
private law side, it places constraints on ownership by prescribing the uses to which 
property can be put. On the public law side, it governs the relationship between the 
State (in the guise of National, Provincial or Local government) and a community or, 
in some cases, between State and individual. This role was crisply outlined by Botha 
JA: 
"[T]here are potentially conflicting interests at stake: those of the applicant 
owner who wishes to use his property to his own best advantage; those of 
neighbouring owners in the locality who may be adversely affected by the 
1 Section 5 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985(C) 
2 Van Wyk : "Planning Law - will Cinderella emerge a princess?" 1996(59) THRHR 6 
3 Van Wyk (fn2) 6 
PAGE4 
subdivision; and those of the local authority itself, which is charged with the 
supervision of the orderly, harmonious and effective . . . . development of the 
area .... In coming to a decision on the application, the local authority must 
weigh up the conflicting interests involved4". 
Secondly, planning law has traditionally suffered from "top down" control. Central 
Government created the broad planning policies through legislation and then 
delegated the power to administer the legislation and to create subordinate planning · 
policies to Provincial Government5• Local Government's role in creating strategic 
development planning was limited and prescribed by the policies set at higher levels 
of government and it concentrated on adjudicating land use control matters if and 
when such powers were delegated down to it via Structure Plans or Scheme 
Regulations by the Provincial level of Government6• 
Thirdly, despite its noble, idealistic aim, planning law in South Africa has evolved into 
a control orientated system, focusing on the physical and spatial aspects of planning 
which does little more than regulate land use7 rather than adopting a holistic, 
multi-dimensional, developmental approach towards planning. The bias towards 
physical and spatial planning places emphasis on the ideal arrangements of land 
uses in order to create a pleasant city to live in and one which functions effectively. 
Fourthly, planning law has been racially based. This has lead to fragmented, 
unco-ordinated and duplicated legislation. 
4 Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995(2) SA 1 (A) at 30E-G 
5 Section 11 of Financial Relations Act No 65 of 1976 
6 See for example the General Structure Plan approved in terms of section 4(b) as read with 
sections 5(2) and 42(1) of LUPO which authorises Council to grant or refuse rezoning 
applications. 
7 Claasen & Milton: "Land Use Planning" in Fuggle & Rabie (eds) Environmental Management 












A brief outline of the most important legislation governing planning in the Western 
Cape is set out below. 
The Physical Planning Act (PPA)8 in theory, sets the base-line for all planning law. 
It aims "to promote the orderly physical development of the Republic"9• It attempts 
to achieve this by methodically dividing South Africa into development regions 10 and 
providing for a hierarchial set of policy plans which consist of broad guidelines for the 
future physical development of a particular area 11 . National Government has the 
power to create a national development plan for the whole of the Republic 12, and 
regional development plans for each region 13. The Administrator of a Province has 
the power to create a regional structure plan for any portion of a region 14 • At local 
government level, the Administrator may prepare an urban structure plan for any 
portion of a region 15• Each policy plan is subordinate to the plan above it16• 
Although the Act was promulgated in 1991, none of the policy plans have been 
implemented. In the Western Cape, the guide-plan for the Cape Metropolitan Area 
approved in 1988 under the previous Physical Planning Act17 is still in effect and has 
Act 125 of 1991. Hereafter referred to as the PPA 
Preamble to the PPA 
Section 3(1 )(a) 
Section 5 
Section 4(1 )(a) 




Act 88 of 1967 
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recently been deemed to be an urban structure plan 18• This plan contains a 
"co-ordinated overall spatial development policy for the future development of the 
Peninsula" and makes reference to the "Cape Town Area" as well as the "Cape 
Township Committee" (Khayalitsha, Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu}19. It entrenches 
racial policies by perceiving the traditionally Black areas as the only areas for Black 
development. The envisaged solution for the scarcity of land is to increase the 
residential density in the formerly Black areas20• The plan marginalises the Black 
population, setting them far from work opportunities and reinforcing the perception 
of Black areas as dormitory towns, where labour required by the Central Business 
District, industrial areas and homes in affluent suburbs, can retire at the end of the 
day. The plan sets out similar outdated ideas for Coloured and Indian population 
groups. 
It seems anomalous that a policy plan which encourages urban sprawl and racially 
based planning has been retained at a time when densification and integration of 
cities is required. This plan is extremely important as it serves as a binding 
framework for more detailed planning. A structure plan created in terms of the Land 
Use Planning Ordinance and any consequent rezonings of land must be consistent 
with it as well. 
Van Wyk recently stated: 
"Although still on the Statute books, the negative features of the system it 
represented as well as the fact that it does not fit the new Constitutional 
18 Notice No 160 published in Government Gazette No 16966, dated 9 February 1996. See also 
section 14(1 )(h} of Proclamation No 27 of 1996 published in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary 
No 5051 dated 27 May 1996. 
19 Cape Metropolitan Area guide plan 1988. Volume 1 : Peninsula paragraph 1.3 of Part II. 
20 Ibid. Paragraph 4.2.3 
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system, makes its future uncertain."21 
This sentiment has been confirmed by a circular from the Province of the Western 
Cape to the effect that the powers to administer this Act at Provincial level which 
were drawn back to National level in terms of section 235(6) of the Interim 
Constitution22, will not be re-assigned to the Provinces since the Act is to be re-
written23. 
At Provincial level, the legislation was predicated on the racial policies which were in 
force at the time. The Black Communities Development Act (BCDA)24 and 
regulations promulgated in terms of it governed planning in previously Black areas. 
The Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO)25 applied to all other areas. 
The BCDA permitted the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning to 
designate an area as a development area in which townships could be established. 
The Act specifically excluded the provisions of LUPO which was "a law in force 
relating to the establishment of townships"26. 
Two sets of regulations govern development areas. One set deals with the 
subdivision of land and the technical aspects of establishing townships27, the other 
21 Van Wyk (fn 2) pg 12 
22 Act No 200 of 1993 
23 Circular No C/13/1995 dated 13 October 1995 
24 Act 4 of 1984. Hereafter referred to as the BCDA. The major portion of this Act has been 
repealed by section 72 of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991. 
Regulations promulgated under the BCDA were saved by section 72 of Act 108 of 1991. 
25 Ordinance No 15 of 1985 (C). Hereafter referred to as LUPO. 
26 Section 35(2) of the BCDA 
27 Regulations relating to Township Establishment and Land Use published in Government 
Notice R1897 of 12 September 1986 
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with the establishment and approval of Town Planning Schemes and subsequent 
amendments to · it through a process of rezoning, substituting town planning 
conditions or departures28. Both sets of regulations continue to apply29. 
, The decision making power rests at the Provincial level of Government and these 
regulations are control orientated. They have the twin disadvantages of fulfilling the 
same function as LUPO as well as being totally inappropriate in areas which require 
less emphasis on control and more on development and urban renewal. 
Enforcement of these regulations has been sporadic or in some areas, non-existent. 
These regulations were complemented by the Less Formal Townships Establishment 
Act30 created to regulate the uncontrolled squatting which occurred once influx 
control measures were lifted and to serve as a development mechanism after the 
BCDA was repealed. This Act created shortened procedures for the designation, 
provision and development of land for both townships and less formal forms of 
residential settlement namely squatter areas31 • The Act conferred drastic powers on 
the Administrator of a Province to suspend planning laws or restrictive conditions and 
servitudes which inhibited development in designated areas32• 
Where squatting occurred in undesignated areas, it was ruthlessly controlled by the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act33 which inter alia permitted the eviction of people 
28 Regulations relating to the Establishment and Amendment of Town Planning Schemes for the 
former Province of the Cape of Good Hope published in Provincial Notice 723 of 
22 September 1989 
29 Proclamation No 27 of 1996 published in the Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No 5051 dated 
28 May 1996 
30 Act 113 of 1991 
31 The Preamble and Chapters 1 & 2. 
32 Section 3 
33 Act 52 of 1951 
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and the dismantling of their shacks without an order of court34 . 
In all other areas, LUPO applies. Its emphasis on control is evident from its purpose 
which is "to regulate land use planning"35 . LUPO differs from other Provincial 
Ordinances governing planning in that in addition to the control aspect in the form of 
a Zoning Scheme (Town Planning Scheme under the BCDA and in other Provinces), 
which functions at local level, it also has a strategic planning or developmental aspect 
in the form of a provision for Structure Plans. 
The Zoning Scheme determines the use rights applicable to an erf and controls the 
exercise of those rights. The Zoning Scheme achieves this by first using the 
mechanism of a Zoning map which delimits an area into a series of zones , each one 
indicated by a different colour on the map, secondly by Scheme Regulations which 
set out the use rights for each zone; for example residential or general commercial, 
as well as the degree of development permitted in terms of bulk, building line set 
backs, height and parking and thirdly by having a register to keep a record of all 
changes to the Scheme36 . 
Should an owner wish to change the use rights on his land, he needs to apply for a 
rezoning37 or temporary departure38 • This entails an application to a local authority, 
possibly a process of public participation and, if there are delegated powers, a 
decision by the relevant Standing Committee of a local authority. This constitutes an 
adjudication of rights. Should an owner wish to alter any of the land use restrictions 
34 Section 3B 
35 Preamble to LUPO 
36 Definition of Zoning Scheme in section 2 
37 Section 17 











on his land, he must apply for a departure39 . He may also apply to subdivide40 his 
land or obtain additional use rights via Council's consent41 . 
LUPO uses the rather limited mechanism of structure plans to plan future 
development. The general purpose of these structure plans is: 
"to lay down guidelines for the future spatial development of the area in. such 
a way as will most effectively promote the order of the area as well as the 
general welfare of the community concerned."42 
Two types of plans are provided for. The first43 ca.ters for the broad strategic planning 
of an area and contains the basic development principles and policies for the area44 . 
This plan also has the power to confer delegated power on a Council to grant 
rezonings if they are in accordance with the structure plan. The power to create the 
values underlying this plan and the subsequent approval lie at Provincial level. This 
power includes determining the level of participation of citizens in creating the plan. 
The second structure plan45, created at local authority level, deals with the precise 
issues confronting a specific area and gives practical effect to the broad principles 
laid down in the first structure plan46 . 
Section 15( 1 ) 
Section 24 
Section 15 of the Zoning Scheme : Scheme Regulations 
Section 5( 1 ) 
Section 4(6) 
Mercer, "Development plans under the Land Use Planning Ordinance", Town and Regional 
Planning Vol 22 1987 19 
Section 4(10) 
Mercer (fn 44) 19 
I 
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At present, there are no structure plans for Cape Town. In order to delegate powers 
relating to rezonings, the Administrator has created a "general structure plan"47 which 
sets criteria for determining when a local authority may approve rezonings. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that State land is not subject to the 
provisions of LUPO. Large tracts of State land are unzoned. Problems arose when 
. r 
the State privatised the railways and created the South African Railway Commuter 
Corporation (SARCC) and Transnet Ltd. To remedy this situation, the Legal 
Succession to the South African Transport Services Act48 exempted the SARCC and 
Transnet Ltd from the relevant Zoning Schemes by means of a transitional provision 
which permitted zonings to be obtained by agreements with local authorities49 . This 
section has recently been amended to incorporate these areas into the Zoning 
Schemes. 
To sum up: First, planning powers vest mainly at the Provincial level of Government. 
Local authorities are dependant on delegation via Structure Plans and Scheme 
Regulations for their powers. In Black areas, there is no delegation at all. Secondly, 
planning law is duplicated. At present the City of Cape Town controls three types of 
Zoning Schemes; those created in terms of sections 7 & 8 of LUPO and town 
planning schemes approved in terms of regulations promulgated in terms of the 
BCDA. In addition, zoning has to be determined for SARCC and Transnet land even 
under the new amendments to the Legal Succession Act. Thirdly, planning law is 
control orientated and the local authority's energies and resources are directed 
towards enforcement. In certain areas, these control mechanisms are inappropriate. 
Fourthly, the local authority's capacity to facilitate development is limited to assessing 
47 See fn 6 
48 Act No 9 of 1989 
49 Section 13 
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proposals relative to approved spatial structure plans. This is problematical since the 
structure plans in terms of the PPA and LUPO do not exist so development occurs 
on an ad hoc basis. The only structure plan which does exist entrenches apartheid 
planning and does not permit appropriate development planning. Also, structure 
plans are limited mechanisms for planning since they concentrate on physical and 
spatial aspects and do not take a holistic approach to development. 
All this legislation was created prior to 1994 to cater for a particular planning ideology. 
Recent legislation such as the lnterim50 and Final Constitutions ~1 the Local 
Government Transition Act52 and the Development Facilitation Act 5~ forged in the 
light of the need to create a new order, to break down apartheid, to perm.it large scale 
development, to remedy the past injustices and to develop democratic and 
accountable government at "grassroots" level, have highlighted the inability of current 
planning legislation to carry out these directives. The next chapter will assess this 
recent legislation and extract principles which will be used to analyse the proposed 
Western Cape Planning and Development Bill54 which has been drafted in an attempt 
to meet the new planning needs. 
50 Act No 200 of 1993 (referred to as the Interim Constitution) 
51 Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution or in some cases, the Final 
Constitution) 
52 Act 209 of 1993. Hereafter referred to as the LGT A 
53 Act 67 of 1995. Hereafter referred to as the DFA. 
54 PN 450 dated 23 October 1996 published in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No 5085 dated 
24 October 1996. Hereafter referred to as the P & D Bill. 
CHAPTER 2 
RECENT LEGISLATION IMPACTING ON PLANNING LAW 
1 Introduction 
The Constitution has had a major impact in the planning field : It has radically altered 
the allocation of powers between levels of government as well as conferring a duty 
to provide democratic and accountable government55. The fundamental rights 
Chapter reinforces this democratic vision by conferring on individuals the right to 
administrative justice56 which encompasses the right to participate in decision making 
and the right to reasoned decisions. There is also a right of access to information57 
and the relaxation of locus standi provisions58. The Local Government Transition Act 
(LGTA) and the recent amendments thereto commonly termed "bridging legislation", 
is restructuring and transforming Local Government. It gives practical effect to the 
Constitutional allocation of powers by spreading powers and responsibilities between 
Metropolitan and Local levels of Local Government59 and by directing the local sphere 
to create integrated development frameworks linked to financial budgets in order to 
plan when and where development will take place60 . The Development Facilitation 
Act (DFA), central government legislation, is aimed at introducing extraordinary 
measures to facilitate and speed up the implementation of the RDP programmes by 
allowing for a system of fast-track land development and creating a set of principles 
55 See for example section 152(1) of the Constitution 
56 Section 33 of the Constitution. However, in terms of section 23(2) of Schedule 6, section 
33(1) and (2) is regarded to read as section 24 of the Interim Constitution until legislation 
envisaged in section 33(3) is enacted. 
57 Section 32 of the Constitution provides for access to information. However, in terms of 
section 23(2) of Schedule 6, Section 32(1) is regarded to read as section 23 of the Interim 
Constitution until legislation envisaged in section 32(2) is enacted. 
58 Section 38 of the Constitution 
59 Section 106 
60 Schedules 2 and 2A 
61 
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aimed at restructuring planning decisions61 , which because they constitute essential 
national standards, apply throughout the Republic and must be incorporated into any 
local planning law62. Finally, there are policy documents such as the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme63 and draft policy documents such as the Urban 
Development Strategy64 which perceive Local Government as the crucial sphere of 
government for the delivery of services, for the promotion of local social and 
economic development and as the mechanism for fostering democratic participation 
and accountable government in the communities they serve. The policy documents 
will not be discussed. 
2 Final Constitution 
The Final Constitution changes fundamentally and permanently the hierarchical 
relationship between levels of government and confers an unprecedented amount of 
autonomy on Local Government. The change in the structure of government is 
signalled in1Chapter 3 which introduces the concept of "spheres" (as opposed to tiers) 
of government which are separate, distinctive, interdependent and interrelated65. 
The principles of co-operative government which govern the relationship between the 
spheres enjoin them to respect each others Constitutional states, institutions, powers 
and functions66 . No sphere may assume a function which has not been 
·•·. 
See preamble to th~DFA 
62 Section 44(2) of trfe Constitution 
63 The Reconstruction and Development Programme : A Policy Framework : Johannesburg : 
African National Congress 1994 
64 Urban Development Strategy of the Government of National Unity Notice No 1111 of 1995, 
published in Government Gazette No 16679 dated 3 November 1995 
65 Section 40( 1 ) 
66 Section 41 (1 )(e) 
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Constitutionally conferred67• When exercising their own powers and functions they 
may not intrude upon the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of another 
sphere68 . They have a duty to co-operate with each other in a spirit of mutual trust 
and good faith69 by inter alia assisting and supporting each other70 and co-ordinating 
their actions and legislation71 • This concept of co-operative government implies a 
partnership as opposed to the traditional subordinate relationship between levels of 
government, a commitment to jointly address problems and to facilitate consensus 
between the spheres72• 
Local Government is no longer dependant on other levels of government for its 
existence and for powers to act. The idea of local government as a separate and 
independent sphere is reinforced by the fact that a municipality73 is granted the right 
to govern the local affairs of its community on its own initiative74 • 
This right to govern falls neatly within the definition of autonomy. However, this 
autonomy is subject to National and Provincial legislation required in terms of the 
Constitution. It is these limitations which must be examined since the allocation of 
power and the ability to exercise such power determines the degree of autonomy. 
67 Section 41 ( 1 )(f) 
68 Section 41(1)(g) 
69 Section 41 ( 1 )(h) 
70 Section 41 ( 1 )(h )(ii) 
71 Section 41(1)(h)(iv) 
72 De Villiers : "Federalism in South Africa : Implications for individual and minority protection" 
1993 South African Journal on Human Rights 373 
73 The term "local authority" and "municipality" will be used interchangeably 
74 Section 151(3) 
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The key to determining the allocation of specifically legislative powers is found in 
Schedules 4 & 5. Schedule 4 lists the areas of concurrent National and Provincial 
competence : Regional Planning and Development and Urban and Rural 
development are such examples. Schedule 5 sets out the areas of exclusive 
Provincial competence of which Provincial Planning is an example. Matters 
pertaining to local government are set out in Part B of Schedules 4 & 5. Municipal 
Planning falls into Part B of Schedule 4. The crucial phrase which restricts National 
and Provincial legislative powers in respect of local governance reads as follows: 
"Functional areas of concurrent National and Provincial Legislative 
competence 
. . . . The following local government matters to the extent set out in 
sections 155(6)(a) and (7)."75 
Before discussing these provisions in detail, it is necessary to note that National and 
Provincial government do have powers to create municipalities. The Constitution sets 
out the categories of municipality76• National legislation may determine the different 
types of municipality which may be established within each category77 and Provincial 
legislation must determine the types of municipalities to be established in the 
Provinces 78 . 
Once municipalities are established, the Provincial level has to relinquish control and 
assume an indirect supportive role. Evidence of this "hands-off' role abounds in this 
75 See Part B of Schedule 4. Part B of Schedule 5 has the following preamble" .... the following 
local government matters to the extent set out for provinces in sections 155(6)(a) and (7)". 
76 Section 155( 1 ) 
77 Section 155(2) 
78 Section 155(6) 
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Chapter. A Province has the duty to provide legislative or other means to monitor 
and support local government79• This echoes the co-operative government principle 
which enjoins national and provincial governments to actively support and provide 
practical measures to strengthen the capacities of local government to manage their 
own affairs and exercise their powers and functions80 • National and provincial 
governments also have a negative duty not to compromise or impede a municipality's 
ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions81 . The Constitutional Court has 
perceived this supportive role as including powers to strengthen and in fact prevent 
a decline in local government structures82• This interpretation is borne out by the 
provisions of section 139 which has the unfortunate heading: "Provincial supervision 
of local government" and provides that if a municipality cannot fulfil one of its 
executive obligations, Provincial Government must intervene. 
This supportive role is closely linked to Provincial powers to monitor Local 
Government. Chaskalson J, described the term "monitor" to : "observe" or "keep 
under review" and viewed it as the underlying power from which the Provincial power 
to support, promote and supervise local government emerges: 
" .... [l]t does not represent a substantial power in itself certainly not a power 
to control local government affairs but has reference to broader powers of 
supervision and control. .... We do not interpret the monitoring power as 
bestowing additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on the domain 
of local government beyond perhaps the power to test at intervals local 
government compliance with national and provincial legislative directives or 
79 Section 155(6)(a) 
80 Section 154 
81 Section 151(4) 
82 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa CCT 23/96 paragraph 371 
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with the new text itself. What the new text seeks hereby to realise is a 
structure for local government that on the one hand reveals a concern for the 
autonomy and integrity of local government, and on the other acknowledges 
the requirement that higher levels of government monitor local government 
functioning and intervene where such functioning is deficient or defective in a 
manner that compromises this autonomy. This is the necessary hands - on 
component of the relationship."83 
It is respectfully submitted that Chaskalson J is correct in perceiving this as not 
granting other spheres of interference unless absolutely necessary. This is borne out 
by the provisions of section 155(7) which grants nation.al and provincial government 
the power to regulate a municipality's executive authority but only in cases when it 
is not performing its functions effectively. Thus if a municipality is functioning 
correctly, neither sphere has the legislative or the executive power to interfere. 
Municipalities are granted executive authority and the right to administer the local 
government matters listed in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 584 and any other matters 
assigned to it by national or provincial legislation85 • National and Provincial spheres 
are obliged to assign matters within their competence which relate to municipal 
govem~ent if the matter can be administered more effectively at that level and the 
municipality has the requisite capacity. In accordance with the principles 
co-operative government, such assignments can only occur with the agreement of 
a municipality86 • Legislative authority is vested in the Municipal Councils, not the 
Provincial level of Government87. The legislative power is to be e)_<ercised by making 
83 Ibid. Paragraphs 372 and 373 
84 Section 156(1 )(a) 
85 Section 156( 1 )(b) 
86 Section 156( 4) 
87 Section 43(c) 
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by-laws for the effective administration of these matters88 . By-laws may not conflict 
with Provincial and National legislation except if that legislation intrudes on a 
municipality's ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions89 . In this case it 
seems that the by-law would override another sphere's legislation. The Provincial 
Gazette must publish the by-laws on request of the Municipality90. By-laws no longer 
have to be approved by Province. It is submitted that the term "by-laws" now must 
be interpreted as laws made by a local government sphere just as laws are made by 
Provincial sphere and Acts are made by the National Government sphere. 
Since local government can now legislate for all matters set out in Part B of 
Schedules 4 and 5, the autonomy conferred on municipalities is substantial. Thus 
in the context of municipal planning, national and provincial government only have 
the power to draft laws which will monitor, support, build capacity or regulate in the 
event of a municipality failing to function effectively. In all other circumstances, a 
municipality has legislative and executive power in respect of municipal planning. 
However, it is not that easy to define the precise limits of municipal and provincial 
planning. There is much seepage from one category to another. A regional road 
system could have implications on municipal and provincial planning. Similarly, a 
large scale development, either residential or commercial, having a large social and 
economic impact on an area could form part of municipal and provincial planning. 
88 Section 156(2) 
89 Section 156(3) 
90 Section 162(2) 
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Provincial government has argued that whatever is not Regional planning and 
development, urban and rural development or Provincial planning must be municipal 
planning91 . A municipality therefore has to be satisfied with the "left overs". I submit 
that one needs to take a more pro-active approach to determine what municipal 
planning is. Starting point would be reference to the principles of legal interpretation 
and the Constitution itself. 
The literal rule of interpretation permits one to interpret the words of a statute in their 
ordinary literal meaning92 . The shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "municipal" 
as "pertaining to the local self government or corporate government of a city or town". 
"Planning" is defined as "a formulated or organised method according to which 
something is to be done"93 . Words of a statute must also be interpreted in their 
context94. When analysing the contextual meaning of the words, the circumstances 
existing at the time the Constitution was adopted are relevant95. At present this must 
include planning functions currently provided under delegated authority by 
municipalities such as enforcing the zoning scheme, adjudicating land use 
applications as well as drafting structure plans and other policy plans for approval by 
the Administrator. However, the limited delegated powers currently exercised by 
municipalities are a product of the hierarchial system of government. Municipalities_ 
had very little power and since the emphasis in planning was on regulation and 
control, municipalities tended to expend their energies in this direction. 
91 Anneke MOiier, representing the Provincial sphere of Government at a workshop held between 
the Provincial sphere and local spheres on the draft Planning and Development Bill on 
1997-02-27 
92 Cockram: Interpretation of Statutes 3ed (1987) 36 
93 Van Wyk (fn 2) 2 
94 Cockram : (fn 92) 41 
95 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995(6) BCLR 655 (CC) at 678G 
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The Constitution has crystallised the functions of municipalities in the form of an 
objects clause96 and has conferred developmental duties on it97 • The objects clause 
obliges a municipality to promote social and economic development. In terms of its 
developmental duties, a municipality has inter a/ia to structure its administration 
budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the 
community and to promote the social and economic development of the community98 . 
It must therefore be argued that the term "municipal planning" goes beyond the 
regulation of land use and must permit a municipality to develop its role as the sphere 
of government responsible for urban development. Any municipal planning 
legislation will have to ensure that it complies or at least is not in conflict with 
provincial planning documents. When drafting this legislation, a municipality will have 
to liaise with the Provincial sphere and both spheres will need to co-ordinate their · 
legislation. 
3 Democratic and accountable government 
Local government, due to its close relationship with the communities it serves, is 
perceived as the ideal vehicle for service delivery and for facilitating urban 
development and has been granted sufficient powers in terms of the Constitution to 
be able to achieve those aims. However, the decision as to where development and 
service delivery should take place is not left up to the municipality alone. The 
Constitution also sets the duty to provide democratic and accountable government 
for local communities99 and to encourage the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in local government100• These key concepts of democratic 
96 Section 152 
97 Section 153 
98 Section 153(a) 
99 Section 152(1 )(a) 
100 Section 152(1)(e) 
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and accountable government need further analysis. 
Democracy has traditionally meant universal franchise coupled with the opportunity 
to influence government by voting once every five years. Burns101 argues that in 
more recent times, democracy has been equated with responsive government. 
Responsiveness is achieved through public participation and by having a system of 
administrative justice which includes administrative accountability and openness 102. 
Participation in a decision taken by government means an opportunity to influence 
the decision maker and thus affect the outcome of a decision 103. Administrative 
accountability means that a government must justify its decisions to its citizens 1°4 . 
Openness means that information about government decision making is quickly and 
easily obtained and that the proceedings are open to the public. This is the form of 
democracy which is envisaged in the Constitution. 
The principles of participation, accountability and openness need to form part of any 
future legislation. 
3. 1 Participation 
The duty to provide responsive government and by extension to allow participation 
by citizens is reinforced by provisions relating to Public Administration which state 
that "people's needs must be responded to and the public encouraged to participate 
in policy making"105. These duties are mirrored in the fundamental right of an 
101 Burns: "Administrative Justice" in SA Public LawVol 9 1994 347 
102 Ibid. 
103 Mureinik "Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability" in Acta Juridica 1993, 
36 
104 Ibid. 
105 Section 195( 1 )( e) of the Constitution 
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individual to: 
"procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or legitimate 
expectations is affected or threatened"106. 
Constitutionally, this right is only available where rights or legitimate expectations are 
affected. This clause fits Mureinik's 107 extended deprivation theory since it includes 
interests at stake which happen to resemble a legal right. It does not include the 
determination of rights despite the fact that the government's power to determine an 
individuals rights can have a decisive effect on his future. 
The concept of procedurally fair administrative action was discussed recently in Van 
Huysteen v the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the National 
Government108 Farlam J, declined to "read down" the concept of fair administrative 
action to mean merely a codification of the existing law: 
" .... even if section 24(b) is to be regarded as codifying the previous law on the 
point, a party entitled to procedural fairness under the paragraph is entitled in 
appropriate cases to more than just the application of the audi a/teram partem 
and nemo iudex in sua causa rules. What he is entitled to is . . . . the 
principles and procedures . . . which, in [the] particular situation or 
circumstances, are right and just and fair."109 
106 See fn 56 
107 Mureinik (fn 103) 37 
108 1996(1)SA283(C) 
109 Ibid. At 305 (Jutastat version, no paragraph references) 
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He further stated that the Court is enjoined to: 
"promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality and in interpreting any law and in the application and 
development of the common law to "have due regard to the spirit, purport and 
objects of [the] chapter". 110 
Thus the section must be interpreted generously and in a manner suitable to give 
individuals the full measure of fundamental rights referred to. Legalistic and narrow 
interpretations must be avoided 111 • 
Since planning decisions taken by government have a material effect on peoples' 
lives, it is necessary to determine what principles and procedures are right and just 
and fair in a planning context. 
First, and as a pre-requisite to considering what procedures are required for 
participation, there needs to be an informed 112 and educated community. A 
community needs to be informed at an early enough stage of the creation of a policy 
to permit their values and ideas to be incorporated at the initial stages 113, instead of 




112 Cowen : "Public participation in the planning process" 1980 Vol 13 Planning and Building 
Developments 13 
113 Boden : "Public participation and the planning process" in 1979 Planning and Building 
Developments, 15 
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But merely informing a community is not sufficient. A community must be able to 
react positively to that information and make a useful, constructive input. 
Participation requires a certain standard of education in order to understand the 
implications of policy statements of a structure plan or the contents of a plan 114 • In 
the context of the new South Africa, education takes on a different meaning. One 
may have an affluent, well educated vociferous group who oppose the concept of 
integration or perhaps densification since this is perceived to lead to the creation of 
slums. They may wish to adopt a "gatekeeper" approach in order to preserve the 
status quo. If this group is not able to subvert the process of participation, they are 
left with a bitter sense of frustration and hostility towards the local authority 115. The 
next time they are invited to participate, they either refuse or adopt a truculent, 
obstructive attitude as they feel that the process is cosmetic. 
The type of education required here is very different to the education required in a 
formerly disadvantaged area where the emphasis may be on service delivery and 
urban renewal. Here people may be uneducated or may have minimal education. 
Education will take place on two levels. First, building an understanding of what is 
being achieved. This may require setting out the constraints under which the plan 
is being created and reducing unrealistic expectations. Secondly, it will require 
capacity building to enable people to participate. This may mean a local authority 
funding civic groups or ratepayer organisations. 
Public participation must not amount to airing emotional grievances. Without 
education, participation cannot be informed, relevant, objective and disciplined116• 
Without discipline, participation can be lengthy and time consuming and can slow 
114 Faccio : "The development of planning controls in Britain and South Africa" Planning and 
Building Developments 1975 39. 
115 McAuslan : Land Law and Planning 1979 109 
116 Cowen: (fn 112) 13 
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down programmes aimed at development. 
In determining what principles and procedures are right and just and fair, it is 
important to establish the degree of participation required. Arnstein 117 has organised 
citizen participation into an eight-rung ladder, with each rung corresponding to a 
degree of citizen power ranging from citizen control to non-participation: 
8 CITIZEN CONTROL 
7 DELEGATED POWER 
Degrees of Citizen Power 
6 PARTNERSHIP 
5 PLACATION 





The two lowest rungs do not constitute effective participation. Van Wyk states that: 
"Their real purpose is not to enable people to participate in planning but to enable 
those in power to "educate" or cure the participants. The technique is to inform the 
community of possible future actions and subsequently, to tacitly assume citizen 
117 Arnstein : "A ladder of citizen participation" 1969 American Institute of Planners Journal 216 as 
discussed in Burdzik : 'The effect of public participation in land use planning on the concept of 
ownership in South Africa." Unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Witwatersrand 1987 
18 - 19 and also discussed in Van Wyk : "ICPLA 11, public participation in planning and the 
South African connection" in 1993 SA Public Law 206 - 207 
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support because of lack of substantial opposition"118• The next three rungs are 
termed levels of tokenism. Citizens have the right to make a contribution but do not 
have the power to ensure that their contribution will influence the decision makers 119 . 
The parameters of their involvement are drawn by the decision makers 120 . Placation 
allows various groups to have an opportunity to participate, but the final right to 
decide remains with the decision makers. On the partnership rung, Kahn argues that: 
"citizens are able to enter into partnerships which permit them to negotiate and 
engage in trade-offs with the decision makers"121 • This seems to imply a relationship 
of equality between citizens and the power holders. On the last two rungs, the 
citizens gain the majority of the decision making power 122 • The higher up the ladder 
that participation takes place, the closer to democratic decision making the citizen 
comes, since the citizen is capable of exerting more influence on the decision maker. 
It is submitted that the Constitution and various policy documents clearly envisage 
participation in strategic planning aspects to take place at the "partnership" level. In 
the adjudication of land uses, participation should be at the level of placation. At 
present, formal participation in planning ranges from "therapy" to "placation" with 
occasional incursions into the "partnership" level. 
Whilst a "partnership" level of participation is possible and desirable at local 
government level, the same degree of participation is not possible for other spheres 
of government because other spheres deal with broader, more technical policy issues 
which do not have an immediate impact on citizens. Policies set by the central 
government sphere would for example require a more consultative approach with 
118 Van Wyk: (fn 117) 207 
119 Kahn : Planning, process and participation (1982) 13 
120 Van Wyk (fn 117) 207 
121 Kahn: (fn 119) 14 
122 Kahn: (fn 119) 14; Van Wyk (fn 117) 207 
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input from professionals rather than individuals. 
The method of inviting participation and the mechanisms for conveying citizen 
participation to the decision makers are vitally important. On the developmental or 
strategic planning side, conventional methods of inviting participation such as 
exhibitions and displays, public meetings, advertisements, leaflets and brochures 
serve merely to inform the public. They are not mechanisms for true participation. 
Since participation programmes occur at two different levels namely future policy 
planning and land use adjudication, it is clear that different types of participation are 
necessary. Policy plans such as structure plans, are forms of legislation, and the 
community should participate in their creation. The notice and comment rule making 
process would be an appropriate mechanism of participation. A public authority is 
obliged to publish its proposed standards together with a reasoned explanation of 
their purpose along with an invitation to the Public to comment by a certain date. 
Comments are analysed by the authority which responds by adapting the proposed 
policy and then publishing the final document along with an explanation of its 
response to comments received 123• 
There are many cases which hold that the principle of affording a fair hearing does 
not apply to legislation 124• The Van Huysteen judgment adopts a far wider approach 
to procedural fairness. It concentrates on the underlying duty of fairness rather than 
a categorising approach. Therefore there is no reason why procedural fairness of the 
123 Baxter : "Rule-making and policy formulation in the South African administrative law reform" in 
Controlling Public Power, 93; O'Regan : "Rules for rule making" in Controlling Public Power 
113 
124 See South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991 (4) SA 1 AD at 12 E-G 
where Milne JA moved away from the categorising approach but still held that statutory 
powers which when exercised, affect equally members of public at large, the public authority 
must be guided solely by what it believes is best for the community and failure to give 
individuals affected a hearing does not violate any rule of Natural Justice. 
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type mentioned above should not be extended to generic administrative decisions, 
or decisions which affect large numbers of people. 
Greater use could be made of bodies such as Civic Associations and advisory bodies 
such as the Provincial Development Council125. Its functions are inter alia to co-
ordinate, facilitate and initiate consensus amongst stakeholders on provincial, 
regional and local development planning, policy objectives and development 
strategies in the formulation of a policy plan known as an integrated development 
framework 126 • 
The notice and comment procedure does have some disadvantages. It consumes 
large amounts of people resources. The process can be subverted in favour of the 
interests of those who are well funded and articulate. Therefore, to be affordable and 
accessible, the procedure must be informal and flexible but strict deadlines need to 
be adhered to in order to prevent the matter from proceeding indefinitely 127 • 
On the control side, participation has traditionally been limited to written objections 
and comments by those whom the Town Clerk determines are adversely affected or 
have an interest the matter128• This is compliance with the minimum requirements of 
natural justice and adopts Mureinik's extended deprivation theory 129 • This limited and 
prescriptive form of participation assumes that (a) people have the ability to write and 
(b) have sufficient understanding of the application to formulate relevant objections. 
It is adversarial, relies on the local authority to adjudicate the matter and thus is 
participation at the "placation" level. 
125 Created in terms of the Provincial Development Council Law No 5 of 1996 
126 Ibid. Section 4 
127 Baxter (fn 123) 97 
128 Sections 15(2), 17(2) and 24(2) of LUPO 
129 Mureinik (fn 103) 36 
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The methods of informing people of their right to participate are limited to registered 
letters and publication in the press and Provincial Gazette130. In certain areas, 
registered letters are associated with final letters of demand for monies owing and 
therefore never collected. Ordinary citizens never read the Provincial Gazette and 
press notices are found at the back of newspapers. If a person does not subscribe 
to the newspaper or fails to see the relevant notice sandwiched amongst several 
others, then he or she loses their opportunity to participate. Legislation needs to be 
flexible enough to allow appropriate methods of informing people of their right to 
participate. 
A procedure needs to found which is sufficiently flexible to permit compliance with the 
underlying duty of fairness : to allow for the principles and procedures which are right 
and just and fair. Participation should range from "placation" to "partnership" level 
depending on the circumstances. For instance, if a large development is taking place 
in a neighbourhood, the citizens should be involved from the beginning of the project 
and be able to liaise on a "partnership" level. 
Local authorities should be encouraged to look beyond traditional adversarial 
methods of participation. Mediation is a mechanism which allows a more equal form 
of participation and is flexible. It also reflects a culture of justification rather than 
authoritarianism. It is often perceived to give "greater party satisfaction, participation, 
flexibility, which in turn leads to a fairer result in the eyes of the parties and therefore 
the decision achieves greater legitimacy"131 . Mediation itself may be problematic 
from an Administrative Law perspective. The power is granted to an administrative 
body, a political committee, to take decisions. One of the basic principles of 
Administrative Law is that nothing may preclude the exercise of this discretion and 
130 Section 2, definition of "advertise" in LUPO and Section 1 definition of "advertise" in PN 
733/1989 dated 22 September 1989 
131 Boulle L: "ADR applications in administrative law" in Controlling Public Power 161 
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an administrative body may not abdicate its powers to another body132 • Therefore, 
what is the status of an agreement on an application as reached by a mediator? 
During the mediation proceedings, the entire Committee will not be present. Council 
would probably be represented by officials who had received some fo'rm of mandate 
from the Committee. If the official goes beyond the mandate, the Committee does 
not have to be bound by the mediation agreement. This could lead to an unhappy 
result. 
3.2 Accountability 
The second pillar of participative democracy is a system of administrative justice that 
' 
fosters accountability. It is a fundamental tennet of the Constitution that holders of 
power at National, Provincial or local government level must be accountable to those 
who are governed. This duty to account also indicates a move from a culture of 
authoritarian government to one of justification. Mechanisms of accountability can 
be judicial or non-judicial and no single method of control is sufficient to ensure 
accountability. 
Active participation in decision making by those who are governed, particularly when 
complemented by the duty to give reasons for a decision, is a good form of 
accountability. Decision makers need to have good reason for not taking information 
obtained by participation into account. 
Since the fundamental rights provisions refer to lawful administrative action and 
reasons for decisions and since these foster accountability, these will be discussed 
in more detail. 
132 Baxter: Administrative Law {1985) 414 - 419 
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3.2.1 Lawful Administrative Action 
"Discretion arises when the effective limits on a decision makers power leave him free 
to chose between different courses of action"133. Discretion is often viewed with 
distrust since it is associated with unpredictability, arbitrariness, uncertainty and 
inconsistency 134 . The conferral of subjective discretion, signalled by phrases such as 
"if he is satisfied", has traditionally negated accountability by ousting the Court's 
jurisdiction. Whilst under the Constitution there would still be the duty to give reasons 
for a decision, the ability of a Court to enquire into subjective discretion would be 
hampered and there is a strong possibility that this would not constitute lawful 
administrative action. 
Discretion, not necessarily the subjective kind, is necessary. Boulle135 states that 
discretion is a "necessary, normative ingredient of individualised justice ... It 
engenders creativity and development and legal flexibility". 
In planning law, different types of discretion are required. On the development side, 
flexibility is required when creating strategic policy frameworks with the community. 
On the control side, the function of a decision maker is adjudicative so circumscribed 
discretion is sufficient. It is the degree of discretion which needs to be assessed. 
One way of ensuring flexibility and also circumscribing discretion is to create 
empowering rather than prescriptive legislation. This entails creating a set of 
guidelines set out in legislation which act as a framework for what the policy plan 
must deal with and which are sufficiently flexible to meet all contingencies which may 
133 Boulle : "Administrative justice and public participation" in American and South African Law" 
1986 TSAR 138 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 139 
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arise. If the plan meets the guidelines then the plan must be approved by the 
decision maker. The legislation might also set out circumstances in which the plans 
may be rejected. If the decision maker rejects the policy plans, he must furnish 
reasons for this decision. This type of procedure reduces the degree of discretion 
which the decision maker has, but permits sufficient flexibility to accommodate the 
planning requirements of different communities. 
On the control side, discretion is used in two different ways. Firstly, LUPO confers 
subjective discretion on the Town Clerk to decide who is adversely affected and thus 
to determine who participates in the decision making process 136 • There is only a 
Constitutional duty to give reasons if asked for. Whilst it is necessary to limit 
participation in order to prevent clogs on good government, the method of 
determining who participates, of determining peoples fundamental rights, should not 
be left to subjective discretion. It is very easy to convert a subjective discretion 
phrase such as "in his opinion" into an objectively determinable discretion by using 
phrases such as "has reasonable grounds to believe". This immediately creates 
more effective conditions of accountability. 
Secondly, LUPO gives to a Council of a local authority circumscribed discretion to 
decide whether to grant or refuse an application made in terms of the Ordinance. 
The discretion is rigidly prescribed in that the application must be refused if a certain 
situation exists i.e. if the application is undesirable or if it adversely affects existing 
rights. If it passes this test, then the section outlines the only other criteria which may 
be taken into account; namely the safety and welfare of members of a community, 
the preservation of the natural and developed environment or the effect on existing 
rights 137• In this case, discretion may be too rigidly prescribed, especially when there 
136 Section 15(2) and 24(2) of LUPO 
137 Section 36 
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are other criteria which should be taken into account such as the policy promulgated 
in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act138 or the results of a public inquiry 
carried out in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act 139. 
3.2.2 Reasons for decisions 
Section 24(c) of the Constitution confers a right on an individual to be furnished with 
reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of his or her rights or 
interests unless reasons for such action have been made public. 
The duty to give reasons forces a government to acknoyvledge a responsibility to 
justify its decision. This obliges a decision maker to consider in advance the specific 
factors relevant to their decisions and this in turn ensures that their decisions have 
better justification 140. 
Section 24(c) does not explicitly state whether reasons should be furnished as a 
matter of course or only on request. Baxter141 is of the view that reasons should be 
furnished automatically since a good administrator would formulate his findings and 
reasons before deciding. This approach could lead to an unnecessary waste of time 
and money if reasons are furnished where none are required. De Ville 142 submits that 
reasons only need to be furnished on request but that the decision maker should be 
obliged to formulate reasons during the decision making process. I support this view. 
138 Section 2 and 3 of the Environmental Conservation Act No 73 of 1989 
139 Section 15 
140 Mureinik : (fn 103) 40 
141 Baxter (fn 132) 232 
142 De Ville : "A contribution to section 24 debate" Part of a research project of the Community 
Law Centre at the University of the Western Cape, 7 
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De Ville 143 also points out that no distinction is made between different types of 
administrative action. This implies that reasons should be furnished for legislation 
created and gives credence to using a form of notice and comment when creating 
policy plans. As Mureinik states: 
"even a rudimentary form of notice and comment would make legislative 
agencies immeasurably more responsive to their subjects than they are now 
and it would substantially improve their legislation because the discipline of 
responding to comments received would compel legislators to confront the 
deficiencies of their proposed enactments."144 
Is a decision-making body bound by the reasons provided under section 24(c) when 
being reviewed under section 24(d)? Mureinik145 submits that the two paragraphs 
should not be read together and a body should be able to supplement its reasons to 
ensure that they are drafted meticulously enough to survive the rigours of judicial 
review. I concur with this view. Reasons formulated under section 24(c) are often 
hastily formulated by officials. The volume of requests for reasons is high. Reasons 
formulated in response to an application for judicial review are analysed by the Legal 
Office and by Advocates. It would be totally impractical and unfair to state that a 
body is limited to reasons set out in terms of section 24(c) when being reviewed 
under section 24(d). 
At present, on the control side, officials are encouraged to jot down at the time the 
decision is taken, the reasons for making a particular decision instead of relying on 
memory. In an opposed matter, where a committee takes a decision, the reasons for 
143 Ibid. 9 
144 Mureinik (fn 103) 38 
145 Mureinik: "A bridge to where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights" in 1994 10 SAJHR, 
41-42 
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a decision are submerged in the text of a report to the Committee. The reasons are 
then snared by the Committee Secretariat during the debate on the matter. The 
Committee itself does not specifically vocalise its reasons for either accepting or 
rejecting a report. 
General legislation is required to give guidance on how to implement the duty to give 
reasons for decision. Such legislation will need to cover areas such as time limits for 
requesting reasons, what actually constitutes a reason, the costs of providing 
reasons. Perhaps, like the Australian Administrative Decisions (JR) Act of 1977, 
legislation may require an official to furnish a statement in writing setting out the 
findings on a material question of fact, referring to the evidence and material on 
which the finding was based and giving reasons. It might also set out the 
circumstances in which reasons may be refused. 
Until such legislation is promulgated, there is no reason why planning legislation 
cannot set out a requirement to give reasons for a decision and give guidelines as 
to the practical implementation of this. 
3.3 Openness 
The third pillar of a responsive government is openness. This value is reinforced by 
provisions conferring on public administrations the duty to foster transparency by 
providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information 146 • 
Access to information has been enshrined as a fundamental right. Section 23 
permits every person "the right of access to information held by the State or any of 
its organs in any sphere of government in so far as this information is required for the 
146 Section 195(g) of the Constitution 
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exercise or protection of their rights"147. The right of access is limited to information 
held by the State and is subject to the limitations clause. The purpose of section 23 
is to subordinate organs of State, including municipalities to a new regime of 
openness and fairness when dealing with the Public 148. Section 23 has been held 
to be a necessary adjunct to an open democratic society committed to the principles 
of openness and accountability 149 . 
Access to information fosters active participation since it enables citizens to obtain 
full information which allows them to "engage in a public contest of ideas and to offer 
alternatives to proposed official policies"150• It also facilitates accountability since 
"citizens have access to documents on which a decision is based as well as reasons 
for those decisions. Officials, knowing that the public has a right to this information, 
make more of an effort to make justified decisions"151 • 
It is clear that legislation such as the draft Open Democracy Bill is required to give 
practical expression to this right. This legislation will also need to clarify what 
"information" is. Overseas, records usually embrace papers, plans, maps, 
documents, photographs, films, audio-tapes, radio-tapes 152 • 
147 See fn 57 
148 Van Niekerk v City Council of Pretoria 1997(1) All SA 305 (T) at 315 B-C. 
149 Qozoleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1994(3) SA 625(E) at 642 E -F 
150 Johannessen, Klaaren and White : "A motivation for legislation on access to information" in 
South African Law Journal VI 112, February 4 7 
151 Ibid. 48 
152 Hazell : "Freedom of Information in Australia, Canada and New Zealand" in Public 
Administration Vol 67 Summer 1989 194 
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How do the values of transparency and access to information impact on planning 
law? When holding Committee meetings on land use matters, transparency will 
mean that such meetings must be open to the public unless it is reasonable to close 
them 153• This will impact on the amount of matters which are confidential and are 
placed on "green " and "deep green" paper. 
The type of information released needs to be clarified. Do informal discussions - not 
minuted - which contribute to a decision constitute information? Does "information" 
include an explanation of pl'ans, documents? One aspect is clear : all " hidden" 
manuals154 such as the manual for applications in terms of LUP0155 and policies will 
need to be made more freely available. 
Access to information plays a vital role in planning matters. Access to information is 
usually requested in the following circumstances: 
(1) an objector to an application for rezoning wishes to see the plan or motivation 
for the application or to obtain a copy of the policy plan for the area so that he 
may make an informed decision; 
(2) people think the procedure was flawed or unfair and wish to have access to 
the file to check the procedure followed prior to launching a review application. 
153 Section 160(7) of the Constitution 
154 · Hazell (fn 150) 204 
155 Published by the Directorate of Planning, Province of the Western Cape 
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A few of the practical problems experienced in dealing with access to information are 
listed below. 
(1) Applicants confuse requesting reasons for decisions and requesting access 
to information. 
(2) A request for access to information evolves into a trial by correspondence. 
For example: Access to a file relating to a rezoning application is requested. 
Information is provided. Further written questions will follow, often inviting 
debate on questions of law or even querying an official's qualifications. In my 
opinion, this does not fall under an access to information request. 
(3) Confusion results from a vague understanding of what rights and interests are 
protected. A person who is conducting a panel-beating spray painting 
business in a single dwelling residential use zone, will be reported by a 
neighbour and he is requested to apply for a consent use. . He is also 
prosecuted for contravening the zoning scheme. He will demand to know the 
name of the complainant so that he can "sort the matter out". 
(4) Further problems occur when the local authority has to balance rights. For 
example the right of privacy156 against the right of access to information. 
Building plans submitted for approval are subject to the Copyright Act157. 
Often, before a plan be approved, it will require a departure. Once the plan 
and departure have been approved, a person who was not given the 
opportunity to object or comment, will request access to the file and plan. 
156 Section 14 of the Constitution 
157 Act No 98 of 1978. Section 2 of the Copyright Act inter alia provides that "artistic works" are 
eligible for copyright. The phrase "artistic work" is defined in section 1 as meaning inter alia 
"paintings, sculptures, drawings, engravings. "Drawing" is defined as "any drawing of a 
technical nature or any diagram, map, chart or plan". 
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Access to copies of the plans would breach the Copyright Act, unless the 
owner of the plans gives written consent. Viewing access may breach an 
owner's right to privacy. 
It would be useful to follow the example set in Canada. The protection of copyright 
is governed by federal legislation known as the Copyright Act. This act specifically 
exempts the release copyrighted material if such is requested under access to 
information. Recipients of the copyrighted materials are still subject to the Copyright 
Act. This provision is repeated in provincial legislation governing access to 
information and privacy which is called is the Municipal Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA)158• Council officials stamp the words "copyright 
applies to use and reproduction" and advise recipients in writing that the plan is 
subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act . Where there are security concerns 
(for example a request for plans to a jail or foreign consulate) then such plans are not 
released 159 • 
Any new planning legislation should take account of these concerns. Access to 
information entails a fundamental change in mind set. It has lead to a total 
re-examination of procedures and an attempt to inculcate a method of thinking that 
reasons : "Why should information not be released" instead of "why should it be 
released". 
158 The copy provided to the writer has no number or year. It is merely preceded by the words 
"Chapter M.56" 
159 Information provided by letter from Jane Speakman, Legal Department, City Hall, Toronto 
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The Local Government Transition Act No 209 of 1993 (LGT A) 
This Act deals with the transformation of local government. The recent 
amendments 160 commonly known as "bridging legislation" are the key to the powers 
of local government as these sections re-inforce, build on and gi':'.'e practical effect to 
the Constitutional allocation of powers. For the purposes of the Cape, Local 
Government consists of a Metropolitan Council (CMC) and Metropolitan Local 
Councils (Substructures). Schedule 2 sets out the powers and functions of a CMC 
and Schedule 2A, the powers and functions of the substructures. The Act permits 
the re-allocation of the powers and duties listed in the schedules by agreement161 • 
However, powers may not be allocated or delegated unless a substructure is also 
given sufficient resources to exercise the powers and it is practical to exercise the 
powers at that level 162• 
The CMC has a duty to promote integrated economic development, to redistribute 
municipal resources and to deliver services on an equitable basis 163. The mechanism 
for achieving this is an integrated development plan. This, as its name indicates, is 
a plan aimed at integrated development and management of an area which is 
compiled in accordance with the general principles contained in Chapter 1 of the DFA 
and where necessary, in accordance with any land development objectives which 
have been set164. There are two levels of plans. The first plan is formulated by the 
CMC. It must take into account the development needs and priorities as set by 
Substructures and will deal with land use, transport, infrastructure planning and 
160 The insertion of Part VI A and amendments to Schedules 2 & 2A of the LGT A promulgated in 
terms of section 5 of Act 97 of 1996. 
161 Section 10C (4) of the LGTA 
162 Section 10 C(2)(b )(i) and (ii) 
163 Section 10 C(1)(a), (b) & (c) 









methods of promoting integrated economic development165 . The second plan is 
formulated by the Substructure. It deals with the same issues as the CMC plan but 
on, a local level166 . The creation of both these plans must be done using the 
principles of co-operative government. 
The Act is unique in that it compels municipalities to prepare their financial budgets 
to meet the objectives set out in the integrated development plans 167 • Municipalities 
are also given a clear directive to restructure the budgeting, administration and 
planning processes in order to prioriti.se the basic needs of their communities and to 
promote social and economic development168• This provision repeats the 
developmental duties set out in the Constitution 169• The plans also provide the criteria 
to measure the performance of municipalities 170• This also fosters participation by the 
community and accountability since a municipality must report to a community on a 
yearly basis and receive comments from the community relating to the objectives set 
out in the integrated development plans 171 . 
These plans are important since they translate the ideas and hopes of a community 
into the type of development that a local authority has the resources to provide. 
Whilst these plans cover a much wider ambit than structure plans, any strategic policy 
plans created in terms of land use planning legislation must take these plans into 
account and complement them. Legislation must take into account the allocation of 
Schedule 2, Section 3 
Schedule 2A, Section 2 
Section 10G(1 )(c) 
Section 10G(1)(d) 
Section 153 of the Constitution 
Section 1 0G( 1 )(f) 
Section 10 G(1 )(g) 
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powers between the CMC and Substructure level. 
The Development Facilitation Act (DFA) 
The DFA is legislation created by central government to urgently address land 
delivery needs by introducing "extraordinary measures to facilitate and speed up the 
implementation of reconstruction and development programmes and projects in 
relation to land"172• The Act focuses on fast-track, multi-sectoral planning and 
development and is designed to run in parallel with existing legislation. 
There are five areas of innovation: 
1. Chapter One provides general, broad principles which impact on the 
administration of any physical plan, guide plan, zoning scheme, guide the 
exercise of decision making powers exercised by tribunals under the DFA and 
by political bodies in terms of any other law relating to land development. 
They serve as a framework for the Development and Planning Commission 
and for the formulation and implementation of land development objectives 173• 
The principles themselves deal with planning aspects such as restructuring the 
spatial environment (by discouraging urban sprawl, encouraging integration 
of the cities, locating residential and work opportunities in close proximity)174• 
They acknowledge the importance of the environment by encouraging 
environmentally sustainable land development practices 175• They encourage 
172 Preamble to the DFA 
173 Section 2(b), (c) and {d) 
17 4 Section 3(1 )(c) 
175 Section 3(1){c)(viii) 
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participation by fostering community participation in the process of land 
development 176. They encourage open government and access to information 
by making information about legislation and the people who administer it 
easily obtainable 177. They set standards for laws, procedures, and 
administrative practice; these should be clear and readily available, must 
provide guidance as well as regulation, must provide legitimacy and give 
further content of the fundamental rights set out in the Constitution 178. 
The principles are unique in that they permit an enabling and flexible 
approach to decision making. Instead of relating only to the physical and 
spatial environment, they adopt an integrated holistic approach to planning. 
The reason that they are able to have such a pervasive influence or decision 
making by all spheres of government is because they constitute essential 
norms and standards. This enables National Government to pass legislation 
falling within a functional area listed in schedule 5179. 
2. The DFA creates an advisory body known as the Development and Planning 
Commission 180 consisting of government, non-government organisations and 
members of the private sector who are directly involved in land development. 
It will give advice to all spheres of government and will participate in setting 
the values and principles for laws and policies at the conceptual stage. This 
enables indirect participation of communities in the creation of laws. 
176 Section 3( 1 )( d) 
177 Section 3(1 )(f) 
178 Section 3(1 )(g) 
179 Section 44(2)( c) of the Constitution 









3. The DFA creates Development Tribunals as decision making bodies for land 
development applications brought in terms of the DFA 181 • The tribunals 
consist of technical experts including officials from Provincial or local 
government as well as experts in inter alia planning, environmental 
management and law 182 • The tribunals use a fast track procedure by holding 
hearings at which all interested and affected parties have an opportunity to 
participate instead of utilising the traditional method of inviting objections and 
comments in writing. They have tremendous power since they may cut across 
various time consuming procedures applying in different racial zones, may 
waive technical aspects which restrict development such as restrictive 
conditions, servitudes and laws and may override structure plans if they are 
overly restrictive 183• They have powers to subpoena and to take evidence on 
oath 184 and to refer a matter to mediation 185• Accountability is created since 
the land development applications must comply with the land development 
objectives set by the local authority. Until land development objectives are 
formulated, the Tribunals will use the Chapter 1 principles to guide decision 
making 186 • 
4. The DFA introduces the concept of Land Development Objectives (LDO's)187• 
These objectives reflect the new approach to planning since they clearly 
envisage a local authority as being responsible for development. They foster 
transparency, accountability and participation. These objectives set a series 
Chapter Ill 
Section 4(2)(b) 






of goals as a method by which a local authority can achieve the aim of land 
development. These include setting objectives; for the standard of services 
for land development; relating to urban and rural growth with specific 
reference to integration of areas, sustainable utilisation, transportation, 
provision of bulk services, the type of density, and land use control and; 
creating development strategies and quantifying the degree of development 
which a local authority can afford 188 . These objectives must be created in 
participation with the community189• Accountability is enhanced since the 
Member of the Executive Council is obliged to approve the LDO's if they 
comply with the section 190• These LDO's fulfill a similar function to structure 
plans in that they provide a binding framework for development. The 
Tribunals are obliged to take them into account 191 . They will ·override any 
inconsistent structure plan created in terms of the PPA 192 . 
Finally, they set out objective criteria against which performance by a local 
authority can be measured 193• This obliges a local authority to perform 
effectively and creates conditions for transparency and accountability. 
5. The DFA introduces the concept of initial ownership194• Once a land 
development application is approved by the tribunals, the applicant may apply 
for the registration of a form of title known as initial ownership in the Deeds 
188 Section 28 
189 Section 27(4 )(a) 
190 Section 27 ( 1 ) 
191 Section 29( 1 ) 
192 Section 29(2) 
193 Mike Parker, Principle Planner, City of Cape Town 
194 Section 62 
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Office 195• There are 2 pre-requisites; first, a professional land surveyor must 
certify that beacons have been placed in accordance with the layout plan of 
subdivision and this plan will be approved; secondly, a conveyancer must 
certify that there is no substantial risk that the transfer of the actual erven will 
not take place 196. The right entitles the holder to.occupation and use of the erf 
as if he or she were owner, the right to acquire ownership at a future date, the 
right to mortgage the initial ownership immediately and the right to sell initial 
ownership but not the land 197. Once the erf which is the object of initial 
ownership becomes registerable, initial ownership may be converted into full 
ownership198 . The concept facilitates earlier access to loans and state 
subsidies and earlier delivery of housing. 
The Act is not perfect. First, the principles are vague, complex and lack conciseness. 
As legislative principles, they need to be direct enough for people who comprise the 
political decision makers and whose knowledge of town planning is slight, to be 
guided by them. At the same time, they need to be flexible enough to meet all 
contingencies. Secondly, sections 3 and 4 are confusing since they both deal with 
general principles for decision making. 
Thirdly, tribunals are not elected and the question of their accountability has been 
raised. Theoretically, the LDOs set the framework for their decisions. However, until 
the LDOs are created, only the Chapter One principles apply. Tribunals may ignore 
all planning which is already in existence. This permits ad hoc planning decisions. 
195 Section 61 
196 Section 61(4) 
197 Section 62(4) 
198 Section 62(7) 
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A further danger is that if no LDO's are in place and the tribunals fail to consult 
adequately with the local authority, they may approve a development which requires 
massive upgrading of the existing services. The local authority may not have the 
resources to cope with this. The tribunal system infrastructure is also very expensive 
to set up and maintain 199• 
Fourthly, this legislation runs parallel to existing legislation. There are fears that it will 
cause confusion as well as extra administrative costs. 
Fifthly, participation is acknowledged to be time consuming. The emphasis in the 
DFA is on "fast track" land development. Procedures for participation are not set out 
in any detail and there is the danger that participation will be sacrificed at the altar of 
delivery. 
Sixthly, the development problems differ from province to province. Certain people 
are of the opinion that legislation drafted to meet this need should "be of their own 
customised design; with different or additional underpinnings to recognise special 
political circumstances and demography in the form of traditional political structures 
and land tenure systems as well as other local conditions"200 . 
Finally, the Act has not been enthusiastically embraced by all sectors of the 
population. A recent report in the Financial Mail indicates a growing wariness 
towards the aims of the DFA: 
199 See page 40 infra for the concerns raised by the Provincial Administration of the Western 
Cape 
200 Miller (MEC for Kwazulu Natal): "Peter Miller examines the effect of the DFA". in Housing 
South Africa, March 1996 8. 
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The DFA and RDP polices are "devices which in the name of equity and 
entitlement, plan to turn to leafy suburbs like Atholl into the mess of Soweto 
instead of the other way round ... It is not the swingeing increases in property 
taxes alone that has stirred ratepayers into rebellion, but something much 
more fundamental. It's that the ... town planning policies ... have summarily 
been changed. Johannesburg's substructures have jettisoned what they call 
the "apartheid planning" of the past ... and are now drawing up. new 
parameters for metropolitan planning that are aimed at soaking the rich ... 
The fact is that plans once carefully negotiated with householders are being 
thrown out so that ... what are considered to be elite suburbs are (by greater 
densification) to be turned into areas the income mix of which satisfies the 
political prejudices and entitlement aspirations of the new councillors . . . If 
communities that make up the individual substructures want this new process 
of democratisation to reflect their interests too, they need to become involved 
in a planning process that's now proactive (or authoritarian) and places those 
who have to react to it at a disadvantage."201 
Despite the obvious benefits of the DFA, the Provincial Administration for the 
Western Cape flexed its newly found Constitutional muscles on 30 August 1995 and 
resolved not to implement the DFA202 . Reasons given were that planning was a 
provincial competence (under the provisions of the Interim Constitution) and the Act 
did not fulfil the needs of the Western Cape as: 
"1. There are already three sets of legislation ~overning planning in the 
Western Cape. A further act, running in tandem with existing legislation 
would add administrative costs, cause confusion and delay rather than 
201 Author unknown : "Authoritarianism Rules the Waves" in Financial Mail, 30 August 1996 24 
202 Province of the Western Cape, Circular No C/28/1995 dated 30 October 1995 
f 
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accelerate development. The province needed to rationalise existing 
legislation, not create more. 
2. The costs of creating and maintaining the tribunal system, which is 
integral to the decision-making process in the DFA, would amount to 
approximately R2,5 million and this money could be better used for 
development projects. 
3. The decision making process done by a nominated technical tribunal 
rather than democratically elected political representatives was 
undesirable." 
It was decided to draft a Provincial Law which would: rationalise duplicating 
legislation such as LUPO, the Less Formal Townships Establishment Act, the 
Removal of Restrictions Act and Regulations promulgated in terms of the BCDA and 
at the same time establish a more development orientated approach to planning. 
This is to be done in two phases. During the first phase urgent amendments are to 
be made to LUPO. The second phase will consist of drafting a completely new law. 
The draft Planning and Development Bill, which is the culmination of the first phase 
was published for comment on 23 October 1996203 • The following chapter will 
analyse the Bill according to certain specified criteria. 
203 Provincial Notice No 450 dated 23 October 1996 published in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary 
No 5085 dated 24 October 1996 
CHAPTER 3 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT BILL 
Listed below are principles extracted from the legislation discussed in the previous 
chapter which will need to guide the drafting of the Planning and Development Bill. 
1. Legislation must take into account the Constitutional empowerment of the 
local government sphere. 
2. Legislation must take into account the principles of democratic and 
accountable government. This will entail: 
2.1 making suitable provision for active participation by communities to enable 
them to feel involved in the policies and plans produced; and 
2.2 providing suitable procedures for holding local government accountable as 
well as; 
2.3 fostering the principles of openness, transparency and access to information 
which in turn will facilitate participation and accountability. 
3. Legislation must be development orientated. First, legislation must include a 
procedure to enable a local authority to carry out "fast track" development. 
Secondly, any strategic plans created must complement the integrated 
development plan created in terms of the LGTA. Thirdly, it must either adopt 
the general principles of decision making as set out in chapter one of the DFA 
or create compatible principles., 
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THE ANALYSIS 
1. Compliance with the Constitutional allocation of powers to the local 
government sphere. 
The entire Bill is tainted with the failure by the Provincial sphere of government to get 
to grips with the philosophy contained in the Constitution. Power and control remain 
vested in Provincial government. The Bill does this in three ways. First, it retains the 
power to determine the principles and policies for planning in a municipal area and 
is able to control when and where "fast track" development takes place; secondly, it 
uses the power of delegation through structure plans, development frameworks, 
scheme regulations and a delegations clause to control the amount of power which 
a local authority has in respect of municipal planning; and thirdly it legislates for a 
right of appeal to the Provincial government from a local authority decision. By doing 
so, the provincial sphere violates the autonomy of local government as well as the 
principles of co-operative government set out in sections 41 ( 1 )(f) and (h )(iii) and (iv), 
sections 151(4) and 154(1) of the Constitution and ignores its duties to support and 
to strengthen the capacity of local government to manage its own affairs. 
The structure plans and development frameworks (policy plans) grant the Provincial 
sphere the power to set the parameters for future development. The procedure is 
exactly the same as in LUPO. A local authority (either Metro or local level) either 
requires the consent of or must be directed by the Responsible Member2°4 to create 
a policy plan205• The manner of preparation, and the method of citizen participation 
204 Section 2 of LUPO defines the Responsible Member as the member of the Executive Council 
of the province of the Western Cape responsible for planning and related matters or any other 
member designated by the Premier to carry out a specific function. 
205 Section 4( 1 ) 
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are determined by the Provincial sphere206 . The plans are also finally approved by 
the Provincial sphere207. A local authority only has the power to create and approve 
specific development frameworks208 . Since all of these policy plans are created for 
land within the area of jurisdiction of a local authority and since these plans are an 
integral part of municipal planning, the decision making power relating to all aspects 
of the policy plans should lie with local government. There is no need to provide for 
delegations in either of the plans. At most, these plans should be submitted to the 
provincial sphere for comment to ensure that they are consistent with Provincial 
frameworks. This would also be in accordance with the principles of co-operative 
government. As presently set out, they undermine and intrude on the powers of local 
government as they rely heavily on the concept of local government being the 
subordinate tier of government. 
The same problem occurs when dealing with the provisions relating to the drafting of 
Scheme Regulations for zoning schemes. The Provincial sphere may authorise a 
council to grant applications for departures, consent uses, the removal of restrictions 
and subdivisions209 . The power to determine what uses will be permitted and the 
degree of utilisation of land in a particular area is the very essence of municipal 
planning. A local authority should be able to make its own decisions on land use 
changes. The scheme regulations also permit the Provincial sphere to inter a/ia . 
determine primary and consent land uses for a zone, to control the aesthetic aspects 
of an area, to detail measures for the protection of the environment and the protection 
of various architectural and historical areas of interest210• Again all these areas fall 
within the ambit of municipal planning. 
206 Section 4(4) and (5) 
207 Section 4(6) 
208 Section 4(1 0)(a)(iii) 
209 Section 9(3)(a) 
210 Section 9(3)(b) - (k) 
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The Responsible Member also has the power to make regulations aimed at achieving 
any objective set out in the development frameworks and structure plans211 . Apart 
from subsections (a) and (d), which state respectively that measures may require 
development frameworks to be consistent with one another and measures may be 
binding on the State, these provisions give the Responsible Member the power to 
interfere with local government autonomy by prescribing inter a/ia the methods of 
participation, preparation and the implementation of policy plans. 
In addition to being able to create policy documents, the Responsible Member also 
has the power to determine how a specific development framework or structure plan 
created and approved by a local authority is to be implemented212 • This gives the 
Responsible Member the power to intervene in local government affairs by 
determining priorities and development programmes213 . 
The provisions relating to accelerated development permit the Responsible Member 
to intervene in and undermine the responsibility that local government has for 
development. The Responsible Member alone has the power to designate an area 
for accelerated development214• Fast track development is entirely at his discretion. 
This will be discussed in more detail below215 • Similarly, decisions as to whether 
restrictive title deeds and servitudes should be uplifted or planning legislation 
overridden lies with the Responsible Member216• 
211 Section 5(6) 
212 Section 5(4) 
213 Mike Parker, Principle Planner, City of Cape Town, representations made by the City of Cape 
Town to Province in response to the P & D Bill 
214 Sections 33 and 35 
215 See infra page 69 
216 Section 36 as read with section 48 
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The Responsible Member retains the right to hear an appeal by an affected party 
from a decision taken by a local authority217• This right, which exists in LUP0218 , 
appears to be based on the old hierarchical concept which permitted a higher level 
of government to re-examine the decision of a subordinate level by means of a 
legislated internal appeal. This constitutes a great inroad on a municipality's 
autonomy especially since the decision by the Responsible Member is deemed to be 
a decision made by the municipality219 • In terms of LUPO, in circumstances where 
the Administrator did not delegate powers to a municipality, there is no appeal 
against his decision to Central Government. 
In municipal circles, it is held that the hearing of an appeal is not part of the 
monitoring or supportive role that the Provincial sphere should adopt since it 
constitutes direct interference in a municipality's affairs. This view is contested by 
Provincial officials. They perceive the term "monitor" as permitting provincial 
government to check the decisions of a local authority. 
The right of appeal however, is an invaluable safeguard. As Baxter states : "It 
provides an aggrieved individual with an assurance that the decision will be 
reconsidered by a second decision maker. The appellate body is able to exercise a 
calmer, more objective and reflective judgment"220 . 
It may be possible to have a technical body to act as an appeal tribunal. Examples 
such as the town planning appeal board already exist in Kwa-Zulu Natal. The 
traditional arguments raised against this is the fact that a decision of a political body, 
217 Section 64 
218 Section 44 of LUPO 
219 Section 64(3)(c) 
220 Baxter (fn 132) 255 
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which may have a large policy aspect to it, will be re-examined by a nominated, 
technical body. 
2. 1 Participation 
The Bill relies on various methods of participation depending on whether broad 
strategic planning or local level adjudicative decisions are being made. 
Certain of the general principles guide the participation process. Examples of this 
are: "members of communities affected by planning and development should be 
actively involved in the planning and development process"221 • Other principles 
expand the traditional participative process by suggesting that if desirable, disputes 
should be referred to mediation222 or "before any important decision is taken, ... a 
public enquiry should be conducted if practicable"223 • 
The participative value of these principles will be discussed below. At the level of 
principles, they are vague and loosely formulated and need to be crisply defined. For 
example, how does one determine if a decision is "important"? Even the smallest 
departure application is important to the surrounding neighbours. What does "should" 
mean? It seems to indicate discretion. What does "if practicable" mean? In the 
Saldahna Steele224 case, the court held that the rezoning application to be heard by 
Province could not be heard until the Board of Inquiry set up in terms of the 
Environmental Conservation Act had completed its inquiry. It is easy to decide that 
it was practical to hold the public inquiry here. But what if the proposal had been for 
221 Schedule IV of the D & P Bill 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Van Huysteen's case (fn 108) 
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a housing development and a smaller industry in an environmentally sensitive area, 
and the housing development was part of the "fast track" delivery programme. How 
does one determine "practicable" in these circumstances? The vagueness of the 
principles means that their effect on decision making is weakened. 
The participative mechanisms for the creation of Structure Plans and Development 
Frameworks (Policy Plans) are disappointing. The method of participation remains 
almost identical to LUPO since it grants the decision maker the discretion to 
determine the nature and degree of participation : "the manner and stages in which 
the Plans are to be made known and the involvement and right of inspection and the 
making of representations of all interested parties"225• 
This method of participation can be perceived as flexible in that it permits the 
Responsible Member to structure the form of participation to suit the needs of the 
community. Therefore, if the community is given the opportunity to participate in 
setting the values, principles and parameters of the policies, and to further participate 
at certain defined stages, and the community has the capacity to do this, then it may 
work well as a system of participation fostering responsive government. On the 
other hand, the system is open to abuse. Province could set the parameters of the 
policy without input from the community, could permit limited participation by merely 
advertising in newspapers and allowing the application to lie open for inspection at 
an inconvenient, inaccessible plac~. Participation under these circumstances is 
pointless. 
It is submitted that the notice-and-comment procedure226 would be a more 
appropriate form of participation and would have the added benefit of making the 
225 Section 4(4). See also section 4(5) 
226 Supra pages 28 
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Provincial level immeasurably more accountable then the present system. 
The method of participation in the Accelerated Development process also gives 
cause for concern. Whilst it is recognised that "fast track" development is urgently 
required and that participation can slow down the delivery process, the legislation 
should still attempt to achieve a balance between the two. The mechanisms for 
participation appear perfunctory, pay scant regard to the general principles relating 
to participation and may not be a reasonable limitation on the right to administrative 
justice. 
Participation is invited through notices published in the Provincial Gazette and in one 
case, publication occurs in the prescribed manner227 • The definition of "notice" 
specifies when and where an application is available for inspection and to whom 
objections can be lodged228 • 
This1 con$titutes minimum compliance with the audi alteram partem principle. 
Publishing notices in a Provincial Gazette does not foster active participation. 
Gazettes are notoriously difficult to obtain. Even if a person knows where to obtain 
Gazettes, unless he or she has prior knowledge that the notice will be published on 
a particular date, he or she will still not receive notice. The method of allowing written 
objections and for the application to lie open for inspection indicates a lack of 
willingness to allow full participation by people affected by this application. This form 
of participation does nothing to build capacity of people to actively participate and 
does nothing to make participation system user friendly. It is difficult to see how this 
complies with the general principle that "a community ... must be actively involved in 
227 Sections 33(1) and (3) and 35(1) 
228 Section 68(1 )(b) 
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the planning and development process"229• It is also difficult to see how this complies 
with Farlam J's injunction that people are entitled to the principles and procedures 
which are right and just and fair in the circumstances . 
• 
On the control side, the Bill maintains the prescriptive mechanism of inviting written 
objections and comments to an application as a minimum standard for participation. 
Again the Chief Executive Officer has the power to determine who participates and 
the degree of participation230. The Bill recognises that there are circumstances where 
this procedure might not be "right and just and fair" and therefore permits further 
participation through mediation and in some cases, public inquiries. 
Section 65 permits a dispute to be referred to mediation and for a mediator to prepare 
a report to the parties to the dispute regarding the outcome of mediation. It 
represents a move away from an adjudicative, adversarial method of participation on 
the "placation"/"consultation" level, towards a more flexible, consensual method of 
participation on the "partnership" level which is more in line with the ideals of 
participative democracy. 
The concerns about mediation have already been raised231 • 
The provision for a public inquiry before any decision is made if it is practicable to do 
so232 dove-tails neatly into Farlam's exposition of this situation: 
229 Schedule IV 
230 Sections 15(2), 17(2) and 24(2) 
231 Supra pages 30 & 31 
232 Schedule IV 
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"I am not saying that in every opposed rezoning application, a public hearing 
must be held .... Wha.t I am saying is that: in the special circumstances of this 
case where such an enquiry is going to be held and the whole matter 
thoroughly gone into by a board which will enjoy substantial advantages over 
those engaged in a departmental investigation, then there will be procedural 
unfairness if the departmental investigation is not held in abeyance until the 
board has finalised its investigation".233 
It is assumed that the form of "public inquiry" as set out in the Bill, goes beyond the 
inquiries that the planning board has the power to carry out234 and would include 
inquiries set up by any other bodies. This provision not only implies a willingness to 
adapt procedures to meet the circumstances in accordance with underlying principles 
offairness but also recognises the principles of co-operative government. 
Informal, non-statutory participation has been encouraged by local authorities for a 
long time. For example, if a developer wishes to create a high density development 
of 50 units on a fairly small erf in a single dwelling residential area, he will show the 
proposed development to the community, who will often request changes such as a 
decrease in density or height restrictions. These concerns may be imposed as 
conditions of rezoning. In return for these concessions, the community will not 
oppose the rezoning application. At this level, the community negotiates on an equal 
footing with the developer embarking in "trade-offs" and participation is often on the 
"partnership" level. The local authority does not interfere with this process and will 
approve the . rezoning provided it complies with the structure plan and sound 
principles of town planning. 
233 Van Huysteen's case (fn 108) at 307-308 
234 Section 52 
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Because of the prescriptive nature of the participation process in this legislation, it is 
impossible to set this form of participation into the D & P Bill. Perhaps the solution 
is to make the legislation far less prescriptive and merely enabling so that it is able 
to adapt the participative process to include the "partnership" level participation, 
mediation or Public inquiries depending on the individual circumstances of a matter. 
Indirect citizen participation is fostered through the Planning Board. The Responsible 
Member appoints members who have knowledge and experience in planning 
matters. However, the nomination of the candidates is subject to a public 
participation process235• This Board has the power to inter a/ia make 
recommendations on development frameworks or structure plans when objections 
are received, on any application brought in terms of the Bill, and on any appeal. The 
Board also has the power to conduct enquiries and may furnish recommendations 
regarding the implementation of the Bill236 • This is an additional safeguard for the 
participation process, and the provision permitting the public to influence the 
nomination of those who will represent them is welcomed. 
2.2 Accountability 
The mechanisms relating to accountability depend on the type of decisions being 
made. 
At present, the Responsible Member has the following constraints on his discretion 
to approve structure plans and development frameworks (Policy Plans). 
235 Section 49(3) 
236 Section 51 
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He must: 
1. Apply the general principles as set out in Schedule IV237 ; 
2. Have regard to the protection of the natural and developed environment and 
environmentally sustainable development in general238 ; 
3. Consider the objections lodged or representations made to the policy plans 
which fulfills the requirements of citizen participation239 • 
These factors give the Responsible Member a fairly broad discretion which in turn 
gives flexibility. However, this form of discretion is open to abuse. The principles are 
vague and may be difficult to apply in practice and the public participation process 
might be superficial. Should this be the case, apart from the duty to give reasons for 
his decision, the decision maker has almost unlimited discretion. It is therefore a 
mechanism which has the potential to create actively participative , creatively formed 
policy plans or to fail abysmally. 
It is suggested that a modified form of the notice and comment procedure would be 
appropriate in these circumstances. The method of creating and approving LDOs in 
the DFA could be used as a starting point240 . The method of achieving these 
objectives and the degree to which they are achieved is left to the individual local 
authority. The Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) is obliged to approve the 
LDOs unless; they do not deal adequately with the subject matter prescribed for the 
237 Section 53 
238 Section 4(9) 
239 Section 4(6) 
240 Sections 27 and 28 of the DFA 
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LDOs, they are inconsistent with other objectives already set or with another planning 
law in the Province or procedures relating to consultation and participation have not 
been complied with. If he rejects the LDOs on any of these grounds, he is obliged 
to provide the local authority with his written reasons why he did so241 . Thus the 
emphasis in the legislation is on approval of such plans. 
In the case of the new Bill, the objectives for development which the structure plans 
and development frameworks must achieve could be set out in the Bill. The Bill could 
then go through a notice and comment procedure so that the community participates 
in setting these objectives. The Bill has to be published for comment anyway and it 
would just require extra manpower to adopt the procedure. Once the objectives are 
set and the Bill approved, plans would be created in partnership with the Community. 
Once created, the local authority would be obliged to approve such plans unless the 
criteria set out.in the new Act had not been complied with. In these circumstances, 
the local authority would be obliged to set out written reasons as to why it refused to 
approve such plans. This procedure would promote flexibility and permit the creation 
of development orientated plans but still provide on effective method of holding the 
decision maker accountable. 
Another area of concern is the frequent use of subjective discretion in areas where 
flexibility is required. The phrase "in his or her opinion" is used to confer subjective 
discretion on the Chief Executive Officer to determine who is adversely affected in 
applications for rezonings, departures and subdivisions242• The Responsible Member 
has the same discretion when he decides whether a restrictive condition is causing 
unnecessary delays in development or is otherwise inappropriate and must be 
241 Section 27 of the DFA 
242 Sections 15(2), 17(2) and 24(2) 
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uplifted243 . 
Although it can be argued that the Constitutional duty to give reasons would ensure 
that the decision maker would have to justify the exercise of his discretion, it would 
be far more consistent with the ideals of responsive government to make this an 
objectively determinable discretion. Phrases like "if he has reasonable grounds to 
believe" confer sufficient discretion to permit flexibility yet allow Courts to enquire into 
the exercise of discretion. The duty to provide reasons would indicate what the 
reasonable grounds are. 
The Bill also introduces a new phrase : "If the Responsible Member is convinced that 
there is a need for accelerated development in an area .... "244• This appears to be a 
stronger form of "is of the opinion". This is still a conferral of subjective discretion and 
again there is no reason why this cannot be transformed into an objectively 
determinable use of discretion. 
The principles state that "reasons in writing for a decision in terms of this Law should 
be furnished on request"245 . If policy plans are created in the manner suggested 
above, the legislation will need to make it compulsory for a local authority to give 
reasons is such plans are refused. 
The principles also incorporate a duty on a department head at Provincial sphere and 
the Chief Executive Officer at the local sphere to keep a record of decisions taken by 
the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape and Council respectively. This 
should be extended to include the duty to record reasons as and when a decision is 
243 Section 48 
244 Section 35(1) 
245 Schedule IV 
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taken, however minor the decision is. Further, there should be some guidance as to 
what constitutes a reason, the time within which reasons should be furnished, the 
method of calculating the cost of providing reasons and an address to which people 
requesting reasons can write to. 
2.3 Openness 
Open government will be dealt with from two aspects. First, the ability of the Bill to 
foster transparent government by requiring that meetings be open and secondly its 
ability to encourage timely, accessible, accurate access to all information relating to 
planning matters. 
The Bill does not go far enough in emphasising the duty for all meetings of Council 
or its standing committees to be conducted in an open manner. The general 
principles merely contain the statement that if a public inquiry is to be held, it must be 
open to the public246• ;T'his is tautologous. By definition a public inquiry is open to the 
public. The principles could more usefully contain a statement similar to that 
contained in the Constitution, namely that a Council or a standing committee must 
conduct its meeting in an open manner and may close its sittings only when 
reasonable to do so, having regard to the nature of the business conducted247 • This 
would enable confidential matters to be dealt with on green paper. The reason for 
duplicating the Constitutional provision in planning legislation is simply that the 
ordinary layperson who reads the planning law may not be aware of the 
Constitutional provision which is tucked away at the back of the Constitution. 
246 Ibid. 
24 7 Section 160(7) of the Constitution 
.;. 
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Access to legislation is well catered for in the principles248 . There is a duty on 
authorities to provide particulars of legislation relating to planning and development 
and the names of the officials administering it, to anyone who asks for such 
information. Policy plans and manuals issued internally and used in administering 
legislation must be available to people affected by them. This means that the 
legislation itself and section 9 scheme regulations which are notoriously difficult to 
obtain, will be freely available. Records of decision are also open for inspection and 
may be published by anyone. 
Provisions relating to the practical application of the duty to provide access to 
information, such as what information is to be released and guidelines relating to the 
weighing up of conflicting rights to privacy and copyright and access to information, 
are lacking. Provisions relating to a duty to educate the public on what access to 
information, is in a planning content is and what the public are entitled to is also 
lacking. 
Whilst legislation such as the Open Democracy Act will cater for the broad content 
of access to information, it will not deal with the specifics relating to planning law and 
therefore some guidance on these aspects is required in planning legislation. 
Perhaps the Canadian example of providing a special exemption from the provision 
of the Copyright Act for plans required under access to information can be 
incorporated in future. This however will require co-ordination between the Copyright 
Act, the Open Democracy Act and the Planning and Development legislation. 
3. Developmental Aspects 
Does the Development and Planning Bill facilitate development? 
248 Schedule IV 
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In contrast to the DFA which is designed to run in parallel with other legislation, the 
Bill incorporates existing legislation, namely the regulations promulgated under the 
BCDA, the Less Formal Townships Establishment Act which becomes the basis for 
accelerated development, the Removal of Restrictions Act which is modified to permit 
certain restrictive conditions to be removed without the necessity of going through a 
lengthy removal of restrictions procedure, and finally it selectively adopts the general 
principles contained in Chapter 1 of the DFA which constitute essential norms and 
standards. 
The general principles are important since they are designed to remedy previous 
planning imbalances and will impact on every planning decision. However, the 
Development and Planning principles, whilst seeming to be identical to those in the 
DFA, are in fact watered down and less focussed. For example, the DFA provision 
states: 
"Policy, administrative practice and laws should provide for a speedy land 
development"249 • 
The Development and Planning Bill version is more loosely formulated: 
"Accelerated land development should be promoted"250 •• 
This pattern is found throughout the principles251 • This makes them more difficult to 
apply practically when taking a decision. Their ability to stimulate change and foster 
development is therefore weakened. There is also a concern that they do not 
249 Section 3(1 )(i) of the DFA 
250 Schedule IV 
251 See comments on the participation principles on page 56 & 57 
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constitute essential norms and standards and therefore the principles contained in 
the DFA will continue to apply. 
Whilst the P & D Bill is promoted as development orientated legislation, it retains a 
control aspect. The Bill seeks to unify all land use control measures. Thus town 
planning schemes approved in terms of BCDA regulations are deemed to be zoning 
schemes in terms of this legislation252• Whilst the amalgamation of the apartheid 
based laws into one general law is commendable and necessary in terms of the 
equality provisions of the Constitution, it may have unintended consequences. Town 
Planning Schemes in areas such as lkapa were either ignored or only partially 
implemented. This was mostly due to the loss of legitimacy and subsequent collapse 
of the Black Local Authorities during the 1980's. It is also unlikely that these 
Schemes were ever negotiated with the communities affected by them. Unauthorised 
structures have mushroomed in these area. A culture of community rule has also 
developed; if the community does not mind the structure or the use to which the land 
is being put, then the structure or use is permitted. Having been brought within the 
ambit of the Zoning Scheme, a local authority is now compelled to enforce such 
schemes253• Any attempt to enforce these control mechanisms, which are 
inappropriate anyway, will probably be met with vigorous resistance. Selective 
enforcement of the Scheme only in the wealthier areas will result in calls of 
discrimination and may be liable to Constitutional Challenge. 
The formerly disadvantaged areas require programmes of urban renewal and 
development rather than rigid control. It has been suggested that a way of remedying 
the situation is "to expand the definition of zoning schemes to enable a development 
252 Section 7 
253 Section 57(1 )(b) 
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process to precede control"254 • The operation of the town planning schemes could 
be suspended and a participation process which fosters development could be 
implemented for a limited period. Thereafter a system of control and land use 
management appropriate to the area could be negotiated and implemented255• This 
process would avoid needless confrontation, accord with the principles of responsive 
government, and indicate a government committed to serving a community instead 
of one imposing controls on a community in an authoritarian manner. 
The D & P Bill lacks a procedure to permit a local authority to carry out fast track 
development. The decision whether to permit accelerated development lies entirely 
with the Responsible Member256. This could have _serious consequences. First, since 
only the Provincial sphere can implement accelerated development, a local authority 
which is charged with developmental duties in terms of the Constitution, has no 
mechanism to implement fast track development on its own initiative. The Provincial 
sphere has argued257 that it considers accelerated development to be a concurrent 
competence with the national sphere and therefore the provisions contained in the 
Bill are correct. It argues that a local authority may use the usual mechanisms of 
structure plans and development frameworks for development. These mechanisms 
do not give a local authority any capacity to implement "fast track" development. 
Secondly, there is no provision to compel the Provincial sphere to take a decision 
which complies with the integrated development frameworks created by a local 
authority or the integrated development plans created in terms of the LGT A. Thus 
a Provincial accelerated development programme could conflict with any 
development which a local authority had planned and negotiated with a community. 
254 Mike Parker, Principle Planner, City of Cape Town, representations made by the City of Cape 
Town to Provincial Government in response to the P & D Bill. 
255 Ibid. 
256 See fn 214 
257 Anneke MOiier : (fn 91) 
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This also constitutes interference with a local government function. 
The mechanisms in the Bill which permit development are structure plans and 
integrated development frameworks. The structure plans which deal only with the 
spatial aspects of planning, set out guidelines for the reconstruction, integration and 
urban renewal of an area258 • The structure plans form one aspect of an integrated 
development framework259• The integrated development frameworks adopt a holistic 
approach to development planning by attempting to integrate "economic, spatial, 
transport, constitutional, administrative, fiscal, environmental and other strategies to 
attain the optimal allocation of scarce resources in an ... area"260 • Their purpose is 
to lay down guidelines through development planning to promote the aims of the 
general principles set out in schedule IV. There are certain problems with the 
structure plans and integrated development frameworks (policy plans): 
1. The policy plans make no provision for accelerated development projects of 
a local authority. 
2. The policy plans adopt a holistic approach to development planning but make 
no reference to the integrated development plans provided for in the LGT A. 
These plans deal with broader issues but incorporate land use and 
infrastructure planning. The policy plans will need to complement the 
integrated development plans. It is important that they do so since the 
financial budgets of a local authority are linked to the integrated development 
plans. 
258 Section 5( 1 )( c) 
259 Ibid. 
260 Definition. Section 2 
PAGE 71 
3. In terms of section 4(11 ), an urban structure plan in terms of the PPA is 
deemed to be a structure plan in terms of the P & D Bill. Thus a structure 
plan261 which encourages urban sprawl and racially based planning will form 
part of an integrated development framework until it is repealed. 
It is clear that the P & D Bill fails to deal adequately with the Constitutional allocation 
of powers, its participative mechanisms are prescriptive, its procedures relating to 
accountability are limited, its principles for decision making are weaker than those in 
the DFA, it fails to provide a fast track development programme for local authorities 
and the integrated development frameworks are not linked to the integrated 
development plans in the LGT A. 
261 The Cape Metropolitan Area guide plan was deemed to be an urban structure plan in terms of 
the PPA. See fn 18 & 19. 
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CONCLUSION 
The draft Planning and Development Bill has been prepared in an attempt to rectify 
the shortcomings in current planning legislation. 
It has been assessed in terms of principles contained in recent legislation and found 
to be inadequate. 
The Constitution has granted local government autonomy in respect of municipal 
planning. The powers of other spheres in respect of municipal planning are restricted 
to those of monitoring, support, capacity building and regulating when municipalities 
fail to function effectively. It is difficult to assess exactly what constitutes municipal 
planning. It has been suggested that it consists of all powers to deal with rezonings, 
departures, subdivisions and consents relating to land as well as sufficient powers 
to enable it to carry out its developmental duties. The Planning and Development Bill 
has failed to take account of the empowerment of local government. Power to create 
structure plans, development frameworks and scheme regulations remains with 
Provincial Government. The Bill retains the mechanism of delegation to confer 
powers on local government which are already conferred as of right by the 
Constitution. 
The Constitution, as part of responsive democracy, emphasizes the value of 
participation. Active and effective participation depends on an informed and 
educated community influencing decision-making at the "placation"/"partnership" 
level. It may be necessary to build capacity to make participation effective. When 
deciding on the procedures for participation, the principles and procedures which are 
right and just and fair in the circumstances need to be followed. In general, the 
participative mechanisms in the Bill are disappointing. When creating policy plans, 
the level and degree of participation is determined by the Responsible Member. It 
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was suggested that a notice and comment procedure would be more appropriate 
form of participation. The procedures for participation in the accelerated 
development process are perfunctory. On the control side, whilst the Bill creates 
procedures such as mediation and public inquiries, it relies mainly on the prescriptive 
method of inviting participation through written objections and comments. It was 
suggested that the Bill be drafted in a more enabling manner to permit appropriate 
methods of participation, which are right and just and fair in the circumstances. 
Accountability is another of the pillars upholding responsive democracy. Whilst 
discretion for a decision maker is necessary in order to permit flexible decision 
making, limits should be prescribed. Objectively determined discretion is favoured 
above subjective discretion. The requirement to give reasons, especially when linked 
to an active form of participation is an excellent method of accountability. The Bill 
does not foster accountability. When approving policy plans, the guidelines for the 
use of discretion are vague. It was suggested that a modified form of notice and 
comment be implemented. The Bill also makes frequent use of subjective discretion. 
This must be amended to an objectively determined discretion. It was recommended 
that if the modified form of notice and comment is adopted, the Bill should compel the 
decision maker to furnish reasons should he reject a plan which complies with the 
objectives set out in the Bill. 
Openness is the third pillar of responsive democracy. It manifests itself through 
transparency which includes holding open meetings and by permitting access to 
information held by ttie government. The Bill does not go far enough in encouraging 
transparent government. It was suggested that a provision similar to that contained 
in the Constitution encouraging open meetings, be adopted. Legislation is required 
to assist in the practical application of duty to grant access to information. The Bill 
has useful provisions relating to access to legislation, however, access to information 
is not dealt with. It was suggested in the light of the practical problems experienced 
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with access to information that the Bill should set guidelines as to what constitutes 
information and how to weigh up conflicting rights such as those of privacy and 
copyright against access to information. 
Land development is important in South Africa. Legislation such as the DFA sets out 
mechanisms for speeding up land development and introduces general principles 
which must guide all decision making. In the Bill, the provisions relating to 
accelerated development grant the Responsible Member the power to determine 
when and where accelerated development occurs. The local authority has no power 
to implement "fast track" development. Part of the problem is that the Provincial 
sphere is of the opinion that any type of development is a provincial function not a 
local government function. This ignores the fact that local government has 
developmental duties. This dispute will need to be addressed urgently. The 
principles guiding decision making are weaker than those contained in the. DFA. 
They will not have the same impact on decision making and there is doubt as to 
whether they comply with the criteria of essential .national standards. 
The provisions relating to the creation of structure plans and development 
frameworks make no reference to the integrated development plans contained in the 
LGTA. Further, the Bill permits the use of an outdated structure plan. Overall, the 
Bill is control orientated, utilising the mechanisms of the zoning schemes to regulate 
land use. The enforcement of a zoning scheme may create problems in areas such 
as lkapa where there has been no, or at most sporadic enforcement in the past. 
Generally, the draft Bill has failed to take account of the principles embodied in recent 
legislation. The fact that the powers of local government are ignored, makes the Bill 
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